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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

25X1

CD NO.

DATE DISTR.

13 May 1952

NO. OF PAGES

2

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1

COUNTRY Korea/China

DO NOT CIRCULATE

25X1

SUBJECT Chinese Communist Recruitment of Koreans in
Manchuria for Integration into Chinese Units in
Korea

CABLE

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
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1. The Chinese Communist Army, without consultation with the North Korean govern-
ment, recruited Korean youths from Korean colonies in Manchuria to fight with
regular Chinese line units in Korea. The Chinese Communists hoped by this move
to win the favor of the North Korean Army and the Korean people.¹
2. The North Korean government at first objected to the integration of Korean and
Chinese troops,² but under the combined pressure of the Chinese Communists and
the Soviets they agreed to assign 400 North Korean army officers to help train
recruits in Manchuria. To offset the manpower gain of the Chinese Communist
Army, the North Korean Army headquarters ordered the reactivation of the VIII
Corps,³ the establishment of seven tank divisions, and mass shipments of machinery
and scrap to the USSR in return for armored vehicles.⁴
3. About 60 percent of the North Korean Army tank forces received training under
Chinese Communist and USSR technicians in Manchuria. Large numbers of troops
started returning to North Korea in September - October 1951 and were attached
to IV Corps. The North Korean Army General Headquarters has direct control over
all North Korean armored units.
4. The Chinese Communists are aware of the North Korean army control of tank units
trained in Manchuria, and are afraid that the North Korean Army will attempt
to establish control over Korean infantrymen recruited and trained in Manchuria
after their return to Korea. About 60,000 Manchurian-trained Korean troops have
arrived in Korea. Some are attached in regimental strength to Chinese Communist
armies on the western front.

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1. [REDACTED] Comment. The date of information for this paragraph was not given, but
presumably it was prior to 27 April.

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2. [redacted] the 25X1
Chinese Communists wanted Manchurian Koreans to be attached to their front-
line units, but stated that the North Korean army had not complied.
3. [redacted] Comment. This is not confirmation [redacted] which reported 25X1
the reorganization of the VIII Corps, [redacted] 25X1
4. [redacted] reported the exchange of
undamaged plant equipment for Soviet equipment.

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INFORMATION REPORT
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COUNTRY Korea

REPORT NO.

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 13 May 1952

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

SUBJECT North Korean Armored Forces

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

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1. On 27 April the total North Korean army tank strength in Korea was about 450. These tanks were not included in the basic Chinese Communist-Soviet agreement which established procedures for the supply of arms and equipment for the Korean war.
2. These tanks are not equally distributed among North Korean infantry divisions. The heaviest concentrations are in the west and west central Korea. The largest unit concentration is the North Korean IV Corps composed of the 10 Mechanized Division, the 105 Armored Division, and mechanized brigades.¹ These units have maximum tank support. The 10 Mechanized Division has 45 tanks. There are 150 tanks in the area bounded by Sibyon-ni (126-42, 38-18) (BT-9941), Anhyop (126-54, 38-21) (CT-1746), Mabang-ni (127-02, 38-18) (CT-2841), Oktong-ni (127-07, 38-27) (CT-3657), and Ich'on (126-53, 38-30) (CT-1563).²

1. Comment. Presumably the 23 and 26 Mechanized Artillery Brigades.
2. Comment. For additional information concerning the strength and disposition of North Korean armored forces

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